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Defining Culture 
 
A British official Brian Hopkinson working in Bosnia has declared 
international conflict management in Bosnia as involving “fighting a 
whole culture” (Interview, File on Four, BBC Radio 4, 30 May, 
1999). Over the last decade tremendous interest has been expressed 
by international organisations such as UNESCO in the “deep cultural 
roots” of war. Cultural reform programmes are regarded today as a 
crucial component of international peace efforts. This chapter 
considers how international reconstruction efforts now encompasses 
cultural reform through a case study of peace building efforts in 
Bosnia. I begin by considering the understanding of culture held by 
international organisations before going on to examine international 
culture of peace models and their implementation in Bosnia. My 
research critically analyses the implications of international 
programmes for cultural autonomy and social cohesion in Bosnia. 
 
International conflict models understand culture in terms of cultural 
identity or a particular culture‟s way of life, traditions and customs. 
The idea of a specific culture overlaps with the idea of an ethnic 
community whose attributes include a collective proper name, a myth 
of common ancestry, and shared historical memories (Smith, 1991, p. 
21). This pluralist understanding of culture, which is often used 
interchangeably with ethnic identity, owes much to anthropology and 
social psychology. Its understanding may be contrasted to the 
classical understanding of culture as human perfection or the best of 
human civilisation expressed in works such as Matthew Arnold‟s 
Culture and Anarchy. Broadly speaking, international conflict 
management approaches embody the shift from seeing culture in 
terms of a universal human civilisation to multiple cultures. The 
pluralist understanding is associated with a certain caution over 
modernisation programmes and the endorsement of multiculturalist 
approaches recognising distinct cultural identities as the foundation 
for social harmony. Importantly, recognition of cultural pluralism 
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came to be valued as countering racism as well as the risks of both 
totalitarianism and modernity‟s destabilising of communities and 
creation of rootless, alienated individuals. Maintaining cultural or 
ethnic identities is seen as useful in preventing social alienation and 
in promoting social inclusion. This affirmation of cultural difference 
will be seen in international approaches in Bosnia. 
 
UNESCO has played an important role in international policy 
endorsing a pluralist understanding of culture as well as a cultural 
model of conflict. We can see UNESCO‟s pluralist understanding in 
its  recent Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, which states 
that:  
 
culture should be regarded as a set of distinctive spiritual, 
material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a 
social group and that it encompasses, in addition to art and 
literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, 
traditions and beliefs (UNESCO, 2002).  
 
The idea of building social stability on the basis of recognising 
cultural difference is also central to the Declaration which speaks of 
“Aspiring to greater solidarity on the basis of recognition of cultural 
diversity, of awareness of the unity of humankind, and of the 
development of intercultural exchanges” (UNESCO, 2002). Cultural 
prejudice is treated as a key cause of war. As UNESCO‟s constitution 
states:  
 
ignorance of each other‟s way and lives has been a common 
cause […] of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of 
the world through which their differences have all too often 
broken into war.  
 
The culture and personality school centred around the works of 
anthropologists such as Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead has had a 
strong influence on UNESCO‟s approach. In her seminal Patterns of 
Culture (1961), Benedict speaks of culture in terms of a particular 
society‟s patterns of thoughts and actions, and stresses the importance 
of understanding a culture in its own terms. Culture is identified with 
custom and tradition, whereas the classical understanding of culture 
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as human perfection saw culture as transcending custom and tradition. 
The culture and personality school was important in asserting a 
common humanity and challenging biological racism‟s hierarchy of 
superior and inferior races (Malik, 1996). Nevertheless its 
understanding of culture tends to re-affirm difference, in which 
cultural difference takes on a degree of permanence akin to biological 
difference, albeit without the previous hierarchical scale (ibid.).  
 
Thus human nature is regarded as plastic, but a culture is seen as 
moulding, even predetermining, a given people‟s thoughts and actions 
(Benedict, 1961, p.183). Accordingly, the dominant contemporary 
cultural traits are considered to dictate violence and war (ibid., p.180), 
but the idea of human nature as naturally aggressive and therefore 
prone to violence and war is challenged (ibid., pp.22-23). It may be 
noted here that the war is not identified in Clausewitzian terms as a 
struggle for ideals, but identified negatively with violence, as an 
“asocial trait” (ibid.). This idea is echoed in UNESCO‟s sponsored 
Seville Statement on Violence, 1986, which refutes “the myth that 
human beings are predisposed to violence”, and again in its report on 
its Culture of Peace Programme in which it states how, “Violence is 
not inevitable” (UNESCO, 1998a, para 2). If the propensity to violent 
conflict is regarded as a culturally acquired asocial trait, the 
implication is that different cultural models could promote benign 
social traits. Maintaining cultural pluralism is thus also being seen as 
important as demonstrating the possibility of alternatives ways of 
organising society.  
 
Here we come to the influence of behaviouralism on international 
conflict models. Behaviouralism sees culture as a learned system of 
meaning and behaviour, and therefore as a system of meaning and 
behaviour that can be (re)taught, leading to the idea of specific 
programmes to create new patterns of thought and action. 
Behaviouralism thus shares the belief in the plasticity of human 
nature, but the very plasticity of human nature can also imply here, 
susceptibility to cultural conditioning. In other words, individuals in 
behaviouralist models may be cast negatively as malleable rather than 
positively, as creative.  
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If culture has always been seen as an aspect of international conflict 
approaches, its role has become pivotal in recent models, notably 
under the influence of social constructionist theories and their 
emphasis on the constructed nature of social identities and norms. 
The social constructionist approach has been neatly outlined by Tarja 
Vayarynen in her book, Culture and International Conflict Resolution 
(2001): 
 
Culture is constitutive of human reality. Culture offers a 
grammar for acting in and interpreting the world, and it refers to 
widely shared practices and to commonly held assumptions and 
presuppositions that individuals and groups hold about the 
world. It involves the social structuring of both the world 
outside the self and the internal world. According to this view, 
since culture produces understandings of conflict and conflict 
resolution, the study of these is an important element of any 
meaningful analysis of conflict. In other words, international 
conflict analysis should be a form of cultural analysis 
(Vararynen, 2001, p.3). 
 
Recognising the constructed nature of social identities and norms, 
such proposals seek to re-create tolerant, non-violent ethnic traditions 
and inclusive multi-ethnic communities (see Broome, 1993, p.104; 
Wachtel, 1998, pp.2-3). Again social construction theories share a 
belief in the importance of culture and the plasticity of human nature, 
but in this plasticity they also tend to emphasise human vulnerability 
and the need for support.  
 
That these conflict models share an emphasis on human frailty, 
asocial cultural traits and the need for external support, has 
ramifications for cultural autonomy, as I will show in international 
interventions in Bosnia. For there is an inherent tension in 
international cultural affirmation and cultural condemnation. The next 
section considers the implications of international cultural 
rehabilitation programmes for cultural self-determination. 
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Challenging Cultural Self-determination  
 
Endorsing the psychological need for identity as a basic human need 
and the importance of culture recognition for the stability of societies, 
initiatives attempt to modify the content of cultural identities, while 
still respecting them. In this vein, the social psychologist Herbert 
Kelman describes conflict programmes as creating a new shared 
culture between former adversaries, without requiring the parties to 
give up their own culture:  
 
the goal of conflict resolution is to shape new political and 
social arrangements that will empower the parties, meet their 
vital needs for identity and security, and lay the foundation for a 
stable, cooperative relationship consistent with the welfare and 
development of each party. Such changes imply some 
redistribution of power, as well as the gradual creation of a new 
culture shared by the former adversaries (without of course 
abandoning their separate cultures) (Kelman, 1993, p.xi). 
 
We can see these ideas in UNESCO‟s Culture of Peace Programme, 
set up in 1994, prompted by the intrastate character of wars in the 
post-Cold War era. UNESCO characterises these wars as “largely 
originating in the exploitation of lack of knowledge of others, and of 
other beliefs, values and perceptions, and ignorance and violation of 
fundamental human rights” (UNESCO, 1998b, para 11). Its 
programme aspires to transform a “culture of violence and war, into a 
culture of peace and non-violence”  (UNESCO, 1998a, para 2). Its 
Declaration on a Culture of Peace outlines it as “a process of 
individual, collective and institutional transformation” (Article 2), 
“transforming values, attitudes and behaviours to those which 
promote a culture of peace and non-violence…” (Article 3), including 
respect for cultural identity and cultural diversity.  
 
International conflict management advocates therefore, envisage a 
radical transformation of cultural norms through interventions at all 
levels of society, while stressing the importance of involving 
indigenous institutions and devising programmes in accordance with 
local cultures and traditions. Consequently, international emphasis on 
local participation does not mean that the population is free to 
 6 
determine policy or indeed, their cultural expression. Historically, 
policies respecting cultural differences have been compatible with the 
denial of equal political rights as witnessed under the native 
administration of the British Empire and in parallels with current 
international approaches (see Campbell, 1997; Duffield, 1996; 
Duffield, 2004). The anthropologist Thomas Eriksen has wrily 
commented that “in order to save „a culture‟ one must lose it!” 
(Eriksen, 1993, p.129). 
 
Symbolic aspects of a culture may be fostered under international 
initiatives, but the consequence of these cultural programmes is to 
erode the personality of cultures. This loss of personality has three 
aspects. First, international cultural intervention is not based on a 
relationship of equality and reciprocity between internationals and 
locals. In recreating the post-conflict cultures, internationals sit in 
external judgement on the post-conflict society, but that society does 
not reciprocally sit in judgement on the home culture of the 
internationals. The substantial cultural reform advocated inevitably 
undermines the mutuality and intimacy of relations, necessary for the 
self-development of individuals and the building of a sense of 
community (Arendt, 1959). Second, as a consequence of the re-
invention of cultural identities by international organisations, culture 
loses its creative aspect as the self-expression of a population 
(although individual artists, musicians, performers and writers may 
thrive under international patronage). People are no longer active, 
creative subjects, but subject to cultural identities and norms 
designated by outside bodies. Effectively, such external determination 
entails the mummification of culture (Fanon, 1965), in which cultural 
features are emptied of their social significance and reduced to 
symbolic accoutrements whether that be food dishes, crafts or folk 
songs or dances. Third, society and the individual citizen are denied 
their moral capacity for conceptualising the good and thereby denied 
their own moral subjectivity. As Frantz Fanon outlined in relation to 
colonial struggles, culture is inherently linked to political freedoms, 
without which cultural life withers: “it is around the people‟s 
struggles that African-Negro culture takes on substance, and not 
around songs, poems or folklore” (1965, p.189). However, cultural 
expression is being subject to external review thereby challenging the 
aesthetic capacity of communities. In international determination of 
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post-conflict cultures, it is not surprising that populations such as that 
in Bosnia feel little ownership over reconstruction. External cultural 
management tends to distance people from their culture and each 
other. 
 
Today, criticisms of cultural peace programmes are isolated because 
of the consensus amongst international policy-makers over the 
importance of culture in explaining violent conflict and war. 
Advocates of culture of peace programmes tend to assume the 
impartiality of the international community, “the privileged empty 
point of universality” (Žižek, 1999, p. 216, emphasis in the original), 
and of the culpability of the culture of wartorn countries, legitimising 
unprecedented outside intervention into these societies. 
 
Recreating a multicultural Bosnian identity 
 
The international conflict model locates the persistence of ethnic 
divisions in the post-Yugoslav states in an intolerant and violent 
culture, and considers international intervention is required to recreate 
multicultural communities and to instil a culture of peace. Let me 
begin by outlining cultural differences between the three main ethnic 
groups of Bosnia: the Bosniacs (Muslims), Serbs and Croats, who 
made up around 44 percent, 33 percent and 17 percent respectfully 
according to the 1991 census. If culture is understood as a way of life, 
the way of life of people across the region is essentially the same. The 
link between ethnic identity and religious identity, for example, in 
secularised pre-war Bosnia did not translate into significant 
differences in the three ethnic groups‟ way of life. Even after the war 
the impact of religious identification on Bosnian cultural norms is less 
than it can appear. For example, Islamic religious identification, 
notably among urban dwellers, is visibly stronger in post-conflict 
Bosnia, but its impact is uneven and arguably waning, especially 
since the war on terrorism was declared by the United States. Any 
differences in cultural norms have tended to arise from locality, rather 
than ethnicity. Ethnic identities do not neatly embody urban or rural 
cleavages, although wartime political claims invoked Orientalist 
notions of civilised Western urban and uncivilised Eastern rural 
ethnic identities. Likewise the three ethnic groups speak the same 
language and any linguistic differences do not effect comprehension 
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and relate to locality rather than ethnicity. The importance of different 
cultural identities is how they symbolise different political allegiances 
that the three groups have had – the Croats leaning towards Zagreb, 
the Serbs towards Belgrade, and the Bosniacs towards Sarajevo – 
which appeal to distinct historical and cultural traditions to solidify 
their political constituencies. Thus claims to speak different 
languages are symbolic claims of ethnic allegiance. So the cultural 
differences asserted are constructed in important respects, yet they do 
embody conflicting political interests and political communities.  
 
Moreover, ethnic identity was and remains politically important as 
both prewar Yugoslav and postwar-internationally drawn-up 
constitutional arrangements revolve around ethnic recognition. 
Following a decade of ethnic conflict, it has been forgotten how the 
former state of Yugoslavia was once regarded as at the forefront of 
fostering state policies to promote good ethnic relations. Ironically, 
the international community has attempted to address ethnic conflict 
by putting in place a similar system of ethnic representation and 
affirmative action, without analysing the failings of Yugoslavia‟s 
sophisticated system of ethnic rights (Hayden, 1999; Woodward, 
1995). Detailed constitutional provisions dictate the balance of ethnic 
representation in public office at different levels, ensuring that 
ethnicity remains salient in public life. Here I am not examining the 
political arrangements made for Bosnia but highlighting international 
cultural management of Bosnia, so I will just make a few 
observations to indicate the context of international cultural 
management.  
 
International officials have stated that they will be in Bosnia until 
they have overcome ethnic divisions and created a sustainable state. 
Yet the internationally-drawn up constitutional arrangements for 
Bosnia are unworkable without external intervention to overcome the 
impasses inherent to the system. Strikingly, a decade on from the end 
of the war, Bosnia still has the identity of a post-conflict society. 
International supervision of Bosnia was initially for a single year 
under the 1995 Dayton Agreement but self-government of the state 
has been indefinitely postponed. Actual authority in Bosnia has rested 
not with the Bosnian government but international officials under the 
United Nations Office of the High Representative (OHR) whose role 
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and powers have recently been transferred to the European Union. 
International officials have become incrementally more involved in 
the micro-management of Bosnian society, unchecked by the weak 
and fragmented local institutions. Internationals have not restricted 
their supervisory role to inter-ethnic relations but extended it into 
virtually all areas of public policy in their bid to realise the 
contemporary international vision of the good society in Bosnia. Thus 
OHR has determined a raft of measures including controversial 
privatisation schemes and pension reforms, along with new models 
for health service provision and family policy. Education, which I 
will discuss below, was not specified in the Dayton agreement as 
coming under international supervision; education‟s subsequent 
inclusion, as a field previously regarded as a domestic matter, 
illustrates Bosnia‟s de facto protectorate status. The OHR has 
effectively enjoyed executive powers, determining the national 
institutions, national symbols and national policy. A post for a social 
and economic rights internship in its Sarajevo office, advertised in 
December 1999, indicates the extent of international determination in 
Bosnia: 
 
The position involves undertaking an on-going review of law in 
the Federation and RS on issues including labour, pensions, 
health care, disability and others. You will participate in the 
drafting of laws, and communicate with local authorities to 
ensure their compliance with Human Rights standards as well as 
their implementation of the relevant legislation. (OHR, accessed 
19 December, 1999) 
 
Tellingly, international officials communicate to locals the laws that 
they are expected to ratify and comply with. The lessons drawn by 
international officials have consistently been that the international 
community will need to be more “robust” and less sensitive about 
democratic rights. In this vein, Carlos Westendorp of Spain, the 
second international High Representative in Bosnia (June 1997 to 
July 1999), argued that “a full international protectorate” was 
required, that this was “not the moment for post-colonial sensitivities” 
(Westendorp, 1999). His successors, namely, Wolfgang Petrisch of 
Austria (August 1999 to April 2002) and Paddy Ashdown of Britain 
(May 2002 to date) have taken an increasingly more robust line, 
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imposing laws and sacking officials opposing international policy. 
Just in July 2004, Ashdown sacked some sixty Bosnian Serb officials. 
 
The frustrations experienced by international administrators have led 
them to blame their difficulties in carrying out programmes on the 
Balkan mentality. In line with culturalist explanations, Westendorp, 
described the international community‟s role as encompassing 
building “a new set of values, new traditions” (quoted in Hedges, 
1998). International programmes have sought not just to reform the 
political culture, but to transform the culture in general to a culture of 
peace and tolerance. Even interpersonal and family relations are 
coming under international direction because of the link made in the 
culturalist theories between war and the experience of violence in 
childhood. The oxymoron of internationals creating “new traditions” 
is lost on Westerndorp, but it is indicative of fundamental 
contradictions in international cultural management. On the one hand, 
the international conflict model is over-deterministic in explaining 
war as dictated by culture in which victims of conflict are viewed as 
instructed by their experience of violence into becoming future 
perpetrators of violence. On the other hand the international cultural 
reform programmes suggest a superficial and instrumental view of 
culture in which tradition can simply be re-described by external 
advocates and inculcated locally without having materially 
transformed peoples‟ lives. Here culture is suddenly no longer 
understood as arising from peoples‟ lived experiences. Meanwhile the 
emphasis on creating “new traditions” is also indicative of the past-
orientated nature of international conflict management in Bosnia and 
its difficulties in creating a dynamic forward-looking vision for the 
country. 
 
Recreating Bosnian Culture through Education 
 
We can see international concerns with rehabilitating Bosnia‟s post-
conflict culture in countless international non-governmental 
programmes. International officials are concentrating many of their 
cultural initiatives on the younger generation, encouraging them to 
identify with international institution-building, perceiving the older 
generation as intractable. As a human rights official in Bosnia wrote 
to me, “Maybe we should cut them out and just talk to the kids!” 
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(MacGregor, email correspondence, 18 December, 1999). This 
remark is also indicative of how international officials tend to have a 
technocratic understanding of the obstacles to reforming Bosnian 
culture, in terms of marginalising “the spoilers”, in which ethnic 
divisions are seen as irrational in a world envisaged as consisting of 
an essential harmony of interests. So inter-ethnic divisions are not 
regarded as reflecting conflicting material interests, but as the result 
of learnt prejudices and miscommunications which can be unlearnt 
through positive images, positive role models and positive 
communication, hence the international attention given to educational 
reform to reconstitute social relations (Burton, 1997; Reardon, 1988; 
Vayarynen, 2001).  
 
Former Yugoslavia‟s education system was praised internationally as 
one of the most advanced models for multi-ethnic tolerance (Pupavac, 
2001). The cultural diversity of former Yugoslavia was emphasised in 
the school curriculum, rather than repressed (Ugresic, 1998, pp.131-
132). Accordingly, schools in Bosnia were ethnically integrated and 
followed a curriculum which, for all of its evident faults, did strive to 
be culturally inclusive and recognise the cultural contributions of its 
different ethnic groups. Symbolically, textbooks, for example, were 
written in both the Latin and Cyrillic script and pupils used both 
scripts. However, Bosnia‟s multi-ethnic education system failed to 
prevent war and soon reflected the wartime ethnic divisions. Even 
following the Dayton peace agreement, post-conflict Bosnia‟s 
education system continued to reflect ethnic divisions and it is only in 
the last year or two that the international community has begun to re-
integrate education. The divisions can be seen in the differences 
between the two political entities of Bosnia: the Republika Srpska and 
the Federation and then within the Federation. So until very recently, 
in the Bosnian Serb-dominated Republika Srpska, children followed a 
curriculum based on the curriculum of Serbia. In the Federation, 
responsibility for education was devolved to the ten cantons. Children 
in the five Bosniac-dominated cantons followed the Sarajevo 
curriculum, the three Croatian-dominated cantons followed a 
curriculum based on the curriculum of Croatia, while the two mixed 
cantons have had parallel schooling. The ethnic segregation of 
education has resulted in the bussing of children to areas following 
the curriculum reflecting their ethnic allegiances. Ironically, however, 
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it may be noted that the Bosnian Minister of Education justified the 
segregation of education in terms of fulfilling minority rights. This 
stance was immediately condemned by international officials, but it 
does demonstrate how the affirmation of cultural difference can foster 
divisions.  
 
Initially international efforts to reform education were based on ad 
hoc initiatives by a range of international organisations and experts 
including the Council of Europe, the World Bank, UNESCO, 
UNICEF, even SFOR (the NATO Stabilization Force). In 2002 the 
OSCE gained the international mandate to pursue systematic 
education reform of primary, secondary and higher education (Perry, 
2003, p.93).
1
  
 
The reform process itself is very revealing of the tensions in 
international conflict models. The earlier international education 
reform reports often ignored former Yugoslavia‟s education 
approach, very much treating post-conflict Bosnia as a tabula rasa, an 
offensive stance given how its old education system was. The hubris 
of external experts in disregarding the country‟s history of multi-
ethnic education alienated locals who might have been more 
conciliatory. The importance of not treating Bosnia as a tabula rasa 
has subsequently been acknowledged, as has the damage caused by 
overlooking the country‟s professional expertise (Perry, 2003, p.19). 
Indeed international reform initiatives have tended to re-ignite 
political controversies over education and retrench positions, at least 
in the short-term. Attempting to redress earlier reform initiatives, 
local ownership has become a sin qua non of the internationally-
supervised education reform process which has deployed a 
participatory approach through working groups involving locals with 
externals cast as playing a supportive role (Perry, 2003, p.17). 
 
However, the participatory approach does not equal local 
determination. Tellingly, the education working groups were chaired 
by internationals and had to report to an international steering group. 
Moreover, international officials have been ready to circumvent 
democratic processes and impose educational changes. For example, 
in the internationally-administered city of Brcko, international 
officials have been willing to impose the reintegration of schools 
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along with a new integrated curriculum, by firing all the local 
teachers, and rehiring a selection of teachers, on higher salaries to 
sugar the pill of imposition (Perry, 2003, p.80). Indicatively the 
OSCE has not wanted to make education reform an election issue, 
fearful that popular involvement would hinder reforms (Perry, 2003, 
p.87). As one international official in Bosnia admits, “Imposition of 
reforms from external forces is […] inconsistent with the 
development and consolidation of democracy” (ibid., p.94), while 
nevertheless endorsing the necessity of imposing reforms. The ironies 
of international experts demanding more democracy and critical 
thinking in the classroom, even as they are rather nervous of its 
expression outside the classroom, are inescapable. Again the 
international education reform process illustrates how international 
support for cultural identities also involves a readiness to override 
cultural autonomy. 
 
Much of the international reform efforts have focused on revising the 
textbooks in the so-called national subjects, that is, the subjects of 
history, language, literature, geography, religion, which have been 
most controversial in inter-ethnic relations. The different curricula of 
post-conflict Bosnia, as under former Yugoslavia, are orientated 
around officially-approved textbooks, and so the revision of 
textbooks plays a central role in education reform. 
 
In line with the international conflict model and understanding of 
cultural reform, the Bosnian curriculum is being redrafted and 
individual textbooks censored to ensure that children are presented 
with suitable role models and receive appropriate messages on inter-
ethnic tolerance and non-violence. At the same time, international 
officials have repeatedly stressed that education reforms will respect 
the culture of each ethnic group. The UN High Representative‟s 
Advisor for Education Claude Kieffer described the main objective of 
an education symposium in February 2000 as finding “an agreement 
on revisions of curriculums, but in such a manner that would preserve 
the identity of all children in BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina], 
regardless of where they live” (Lenhart et al, 1999). Repeatedly 
international reports give education an important role in “cultural 
identity preservation” and “instilling pride in one‟s culture, history 
and heritage” (Perry, 2003, p.15). However, international cultural 
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recognition immediately faces the problem that the cultural identities 
being asserted today are incompatible with each other and the 
political allegiance the international community wishes to promote, as 
well as with the international culture of peace model. Thus the 
international education group wants to challenge Bosnian Croat 
identification with Croatia, and Bosnian Serb identification with 
Serbia, and Muslim identification of themselves as the victims in the 
war. This is outlined in a summary report on the above symposium: 
 
The expert team from the Heidelberg University that prepared 
the report found unacceptable aspects in the curriculums of all 
three peoples. Bosniaks insist on their position as victim of the 
recent war. Croats obviously ignore the other peoples in BiH 
[Bosnia and Herzegovina] and emphasize their love towards the 
Republic of Croatia. The insolent attitude in the RS [Republika 
Srpska] is based on a belonging to “the Serb fatherland” leaning 
on Serbia and refusing to be part of BiH (Lenart et al, 1999, p. 
27).  
 
The first aspect of realising a moral Bosnian identity and community 
is defining the community as Bosnian, reintegrating schools and 
eradicating content that undermines the state of Bosnia, such as the 
inclusion of the Yugoslav anthem in Bosnian Serb textbooks. The 
second aspect relates to reforming the three main ethnic identities and 
aspects of their cultural tradition, and it is this aspect that I now want 
to focus on.  
 
Let me first take the reforms expected of the Bosniac identity in 
relation to history textbooks as my first example, before examining an 
international review of Bosnian Serb literature textbooks in more 
detail. The international experts‟ report to UNESCO is critical of the 
Bosniac syllabus for its “view of history in which Bosniacs are 
mainly seen as victims of aggression, genocide, ethnic cleansing in 
past and present” (Lenart, 1999, p.27). Their approach to history, as 
that of the Bosnian Croats and Serbs, is considered divisive and an 
obstacle to overcoming ethnic division. The Bosnian authorities have 
been required to delete from school textbooks comparisons of 
Milosevic to Hitler and the Serbs to the Nazis. But it is disingenuous 
for the Bosniacs to be told that they must remove reference to the war 
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as genocide, and may not characterise the Croats and Serbs as 
aggressors when the international community and the Western media 
have repeatedly endorsed their understanding of themselves as 
victims of aggression and genocide. Indeed the Chicago Education 
Board authorised a television programme with views that would fall 
foul of the international requirements for the Bosnian media and 
schools. Nevertheless, while the West has justified its intervention in 
the region in terms of stopping aggression and genocide, a non-
divisive version of these events is somehow to be constructed 
respecting the Bosniac version, but also inclusive of ethnic Croats or 
Serbs and their suffering. However, divisions cannot be simply re-
described or papered over in the curriculum, as evident in the ultimate 
failure of former Yugoslavia‟s multi-ethnic education policies to 
overcome ethnic differences. It is difficult to envisage content 
celebrating ethnic diversity that could be currently mutually 
acceptable and convincing when many of the nationalist stereotypes 
appear to have been realised for each ethnic group as a result of 
atrocities committed during the war. The only way that the 
curriculum can help move beyond current divisions is by promoting 
as full an examination of issues as possible. But the international 
community is putting certain discussions off limits. The warning of 
one international official, that the textbook reforms should not simply 
mean “new mono-perspectives” replace “the old-mono perspective 
histories” (Perry, 2003, p.99), is apposite. So whereas the old 
Yugoslav textbooks may be criticised for glossing over past inter-
ethnic conflicts and being uncritical towards the Yugoslav authorities, 
equally, international advisors have struggled to address the past in 
textbooks, while also expecting to present the role of the international 
community in positive terms. Notably, international officials have 
been reluctant to allow textbooks to discuss the conflict in the wider 
international context or criticisms against the international 
community. The international experts have adopted an uncritical 
approach, wanting textbooks to treat the international community and 
Europe as neutral, unproblematic concepts (for example, Lenart et al., 
1999, p.13). Content orientated towards Europe and the international 
community is considered desirable and has been praised by the 
international education experts (ibid.), while material critical of 
European institutions or the international community has been 
condemned (ibid., p.54). Hence a sanitised view of international 
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institutions and policies is to be presented. But unless the conflict is 
discussed in relation to international developments then the three 
main ethnic groups are left with mutual recriminations. At the same 
time a culture deferential to the international community is to be 
cultivated and enforced in Bosnia.  
 
I will now focus on the international review of Bosnian Serb literature 
textbooks. International officials have been judging the content of the 
literature textbooks, for example, according to whether the works 
contribute towards the ethnic identities and traditions that the 
international community wants to instil. The review of Bosnian Serb 
literature textbooks is particularly interesting because of how they 
touch upon the core of the South Slav cultural tradition as well as key 
problems in the international officials‟ attempt to preserve and 
reconcile conflicting cultural identities. Past literary works, such as 
epics from the oral tradition, have come in for criticism. As Perry 
observes, “While the teaching of Serb poems might be viewed as 
study of legitimate cultural heritage by Bosnian Serbs, it can be seen 
as an expression of extreme nationalism by Bosniaks” (Perry, 2003, 
p. 36). An international experts‟ report to UNESCO drew attention to 
how, “In the people‟s (oral) literature there are some poems against 
the Turks and Austrians (not acceptable)” (Lenart et al., p.42). Given 
the centuries of foreign rule, it is unsurprising that folk tradition 
should express hostility to its rulers. Undoubtedly, the international 
censorship of these or other works deemed offensive to any of the 
ethnic groups may contribute to a new sanitised history and tradition, 
but rather unconvincingly and belittling in the process all the parties 
as lacking the capacity to renegotiate their relations and cultural 
heritage. The proposed censorship of works from the oral tradition 
and other classical works has tremendous political and cultural 
significance. The rediscovery of the oral tradition in the nineteenth 
century and the flourishing of South Slav culture was seen as 
representing the stirrings of national self-determination, celebrated 
not just in the region but across Europe. The publication in 1847 of 
the epic poem The Mountain Wreath by Petar II Petrovic Njegos, 
Orthodox Archbishop and statesman from Montenegro, came to 
symbolise the struggle for national self-determination. His works 
were not just read and appreciated by Serbs, but by others seeking 
greater independence for the South Slavs. The Catholic Bishop 
 17 
Strossmayer‟s library contained collections of the oral poetry 
compiled by Vuk Karadzic and works by Njegos, while the Croatian 
sculptor Ivan Mestrovic was inspired to build a statue to Njegos. 
Anti-Turkish or anti-Muslim elements in Njegos or other works were 
read in the context of centuries under the Ottoman Rule (Zogovic, 
1947, pp.247-270). Their themes may be compared to foreign poems 
on similar themes, for example, Lord Byron‟s poetry promoting the 
cause of Greek independence or Alfred Tennyson‟s poem 
“Montenegro” (Ricks, 1969, p.1240, discussed in Norris, p.28) or 
anti-English themes in Irish literature or anti-Spanish in Dutch 
literature and so on. Indeed, were the international community to 
censor books in school on the grounds of negative portrayals of 
Bosnian Muslims, Ottoman officials or Islamic clerics, then this 
would effect the works of Mesa Selimovic, a key twentieth century 
Bosnian novelist of Muslim ethnicity. His compelling novel Death 
and the Dervish explores contemporary political oppression through a 
Kafkaesque treatment of Bosnia under Ottoman rule. Likewise 
Croatia‟s most famous twentieth century author Miroslav Krleza 
could fall foul of censorship of negative portrayals of Austrians, 
Croats, Hapsburg officials or Catholic priests. Consequently, were 
works to be excised for their negative portrayals, this would excise 
some of the best works that the region has produced, affecting the 
cultural expression of the aggrieved group as well since the most 
damning portrayals often come from within a cultural tradition. The 
novels of the Serbian writer Slobodan Selenic, for example, which I 
discuss below, represent some of the most critical explorations of 
Serbian politics and culture. His works would fall foul of any ban on 
negative portrayals of Serbs. 
 
At issue in the textbook reforms is not a question of replacing one 
verse or extract with another – quiet revisions were already 
contemplated by Serbian officials – but the symbolic and actual loss 
of the right to self-determination. The international community‟s 
measures to expunge negative portrayals of the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian Empires from Bosnian Serb textbooks represents a 
ridiculous sanitisation of history. The removal of various works from 
the oral tradition and other key authors by international officials 
signifies curtailment of cultural self-determination, alongside political 
self-determination and symbolic reversal of emancipatory 
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developments of the last two centuries. Moreover, the unintended but 
foreseeable consequences of such international measures is constantly 
to recreate nationalist cause célèbres, fuelling on-going ethnic 
insecurity and tensions, and discouraging any sense of ownership and 
responsibility for rebuilding of peaceful ethnic relations. Meanwhile, 
popular culture, notably music, has continued to be shared across the 
ethnic divisions, belying cultural defensiveness over preserving 
distinct cultural identities as well the assumptions of international 
cultural management. 
 
Works not previously deemed offensive to ethnic identities are being 
censored, representing a major assault on the right to cultural 
expression. The erosion of the region‟s cultural autonomy is 
illustrated in the treatment of Andric‟s The Bridge Over The Drina 
(1959) for which the author won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 
1961. The work has had huge cultural and political significance. 
Andric wrote at the time of the award that, “I think that my country, 
through its literature, has received international recognition” (quoted 
in Hawkesworth, 1984, p.30). Chronicling tales in the town of 
Visegrad over three and a half centuries of Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian rule, extracts from The Bridge Over The Drina commonly 
appeared in school textbooks in former Yugoslavia. A popular 
passage cited was his description of Christian children being taken 
away as blood tribute by the Ottoman authorities to be trained as 
janissaries, one of whom becomes the Grand Vezir Mehmed Pasha 
who was to build the famous bridge (Andric, 1959, pp.23-26.). 
However, the international working group on education wants the 
familiar passage, a cruel but poignant rags-to-riches tale exploring 
division and reconciliation through the vision of the bridge, removed 
from the Bosnian Serb reader on literature because it is now deemed 
offensive to the Bosniacs and inimical to ethnic reconciliation. But it 
appears that some readers are more equal than others when it comes 
to choosing what they may read. For while the OHR was seeking to 
censor passages of The Bridge Over The Drina former High 
Representative Petrisch, then presiding over the textbook revisions, 
praised the novel in his diary (OHR, 1999). 
 
Censorship of the work in school textbooks would represent heavier 
censorship than Andric experienced under the most repressive periods 
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of Communist rule in Yugoslavia. Works such as The Bridge Over 
The Drina were published in the 1940s, despite the official doctrine 
of Socialist Realism in literature and some official doubts about 
Andric‟s political loyalty to the new regime because of his diplomatic 
career in pre-war Yugoslavia. The Bridge over The Drina was not 
considered by the Yugoslav authorities to contravene the policy of 
brotherhood and unity or offend Yugoslavia‟s ethnic groups, quite the 
contrary. The belief that Andric was shared by all the ethnic groups of 
Yugoslavia was underscored by his refusal to declare himself a 
particular ethnic identity. Personally sanctioning its publication, the 
Yugoslav Commissar for Culture Radovan Zogovic praised Andric‟s 
chronicle for its humanism and its bridging of differences between 
people in general, irrespective of their ethnic or social background 
(Zogovic, 1947, pp.221-222). Such were the reasons why Andric won 
the Nobel Prize for Literature. Critics did not previously discuss 
Andric‟s works as being anti-Muslim (Arzunovic, 1999; Eekman 
1978, pp.91-101; Lukic, 1972; Hawkesworth, 1984; Norris, 1999, 
pp.59-68, 90; Wachtel, 1997). This is a phenomenon that has come to 
the fore since the outbreak of war. Cultural specialists exploring anti-
Croat and anti-Muslim sentiment in Serbian literature do not single 
out Andric‟s writing in this regard: Arzunovic, for example, describes 
Andric as pro-Bosnian (Arzunovic, 1999, p.138), while Wachtel 
relegates contention to a footnote (Wachtel, 1997, pp.274-275). 
Attacking Andric for stereotyping Muslims is to read today‟s ethnic 
divisions into his work. One cannot discern discrimination in his 
characterisation of his Croatian, Muslim or Serbian figures, nor has 
past criticism. Where Andric‟s characterisation has previously been 
criticised, it has been for caricaturing people of the region in general, 
rather than particular ethnic groups. For example, his characterisation 
has been criticised as “exotic” colouration, appealing to Western 
stereotypes of the region as “„Balkan,‟ „oriental,‟ „peasant,‟” and 
expectations of “dark motives, killings and primitivism” (Lukic, 
1972, p.158). The portrayal of Andric as anti-Muslim or anti-Croat 
has arisen from Andric‟s role as symbolising a common Yugoslav 
identity – therefore in the current political circumstances being 
associated with Serbian nationalism.  
 
Reminiscent of Orwell‟s goodspeak, rather than the humanism of 
“nothing human is alien to me”, the themes of textbooks are to be 
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restricted to subjects providing unambiguous models of behaviour. 
Literary works depicting scenes of hatred and violence are deplored 
and equated with acts of violence as a consequence of a belief in a 
continuum of violence and contemporary theories positing the direct 
effects of negative representations on individuals (see for example, 
Fish, 1994).  
 
The consequence is to severely restrict the approved literary canon. 
Newer works that have deliberately sought to explore contemporary 
nationalism without being simplistic have found themselves 
condemned as nationalist. In particular, there has been a failure to 
distinguish between the author‟s views and those of the characters 
portrayed. The novels of Slobodan Selenic (1933-1995) have 
explored issues of national identity and the impact of ethnic divisions 
and war on different generations (Selenic, 1990b, 1996, 1996).
2
 His 
novel Timor Mortis (1991) sought to undermine the legitimacy of 
nationalists claiming that Croatian and Serbian relations were 
inherently hostile by the literary device of exposing his characters 
making such assertions as unreliable narrators.
3
 This is a literary 
device used by other regional writers, most notably by Selimovic in 
his novel Death and The Dervish. However, reductive readings of his 
novel have treated Selenic‟s views as identical to nationalist anti-
Croatian views expressed by these unreliable narrators (Arzunovic, 
1999, p.140; Wachtel, 1997, pp.219-223). In one such literal reading, 
Wachtel accuses Selenic of changing from a “belief in Yugoslavism 
[...] towards particularist nationalism” and as “ultimately encouraging 
the kind of seemingly irrational aggressive behaviour by Serbs in 
mixed Serb-Croat regions that was so characteristic of the 1991 war” 
(Wachtel, 1997, p.219) despite Selenic‟s publicly and privately 
stated-views affirming the desirability of ethnic coexistence.
4
 The 
superficial interpretation of Selenic‟s novel illustrates how writers 
and their public in the region are prejudged as intolerant and unable to 
see beyond stereotypes. Alarmingly, the consequence of such 
readings resulted in calls for the removal of his novel Timor Mortis 
from the syllabus, although it is precisely a text seeking to challenge 
stereotypes in an interesting literary way.  
 
A broader implication is that literature is to eschew the messiness of 
life and readers are to be confined to sanitised themes that cause no 
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offence and ensure no confusion over their meaning. As Selenic 
himself warned (in Jevtic, 1991, p.42), if politics is to dictate 
literature, there is a danger of stifling creativity and reducing 
literature to political tracts. Instead of removing Selenic‟s texts a 
more imaginative approach promoting critical reading would be, for 
example, to discuss Selenic and Selimovic‟s work together and their 
use of unreliable narrators to address social prejudices and political 
oppression. Again a freer exploration of the region‟s literary 
traditions, instead of its over-cautious management, would foster 
understanding of both past inter-ethnic conflict and past inter-ethnic 
cooperation. Selimovic, for example, identified himself as a Serbian 
writer, that is, with the Serbian literary tradition, despite his Muslim 
ethnicity. His case illustrates how cultural identities overlap (here 
Bosnian and Serbian), that a literary tradition should not be seen in 
mono-ethnic terms (here Serbian), and that great cultural expression 
transcends identity and speaks to humanity, whatever the specificity 
of its subject. However, international cultural reform initiatives seeing 
social harmony in affirming distinct cultural identities even as they 
seek to reform them, actually reinforce a sense of difference.  
 
The international community does not just see its remit as stamping 
out nationalist content in textbooks and the media, but has taken on 
the role of general censor to judge the appropriateness of violent 
themes per se. There is further international censorship of material 
deemed inappropriate as imparting premature knowledge of violence, 
which is deemed to inculcate violence as opposed to counter violence 
– influenced by the rather passive notion of human plasticity which 
informs international conflict models. As a consequence of fears of 
early exposure to violence leading to violence rather than a rejection 
of violence, there is even international censorship where the violence 
is shown for didactic purposes to instil aversion to war. For example, 
the report to UNESCO does not find the watching of films on the 
Holocaust at Grade 3 level acceptable in the subject Nature and 
Society in the Serbian curriculum, stating, “The contents on the 
genocide committed against Serbs, Jews and Roma, although 
corresponding to reality, are in the context of grade 3 just tolerable. 
What is by all means not acceptable is the relevant instruction on 
„watching movies about the genocide‟” (Lenhart et al., 1999, p.45). 
Violence on television is also supervised, including in news reports. 
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A television station in Republika Srpska was ordered to pay a fine for 
showing footage of the war in Chechnya that international officials 
considered unsuitable for children and elderly people (OHR, 
Summary of Radio-Television, 1999). 
 
Alienating Culture? 
 
The lack of trust underlying the continuing extension of international 
regulation of the post-Yugoslav states is resulting in the erosion of 
cultural self-determination. Ironically, fear of the development of a 
culture of dependency has repeatedly been expressed by international 
officials, but a culture of dependency is the logic of the extensive 
international cultural management. Rule by international officials is 
reminiscent of a return to the days of the consuls, which Andric wrote 
about so evocatively. Yet past foreign rulers in certain respects had a 
more laissez faire attitude towards the beliefs of their subjects (and a 
leaner administration). International officials‟ expanding remit in 
Bosnia demonstrates a systematic attempt to re-create a Bosnian 
multi-ethnic culture, but their technocratic approach risks alienating 
the population as well as impoverishing cultural expression and 
distorting the country‟s rich cultural influences. The international 
community‟s efforts may successfully re-create a new official multi-
ethnic culture, but to what extent the population identifies with it is a 
harder problem to resolve. Sanitising history and cultural expression 
can only create an unconvincing shared cultural identity. International 
success in this area ultimately depends on the degree to which the 
population feels secure in the new state. As long as people continue to 
feel insecure in Bosnia and see security lying in their ethnic ties or 
outside the country then they will continue to be defensive over their 
separate cultural identities. Indicatively while international officials 
see hope in Bosnia‟s youth, many young people in the country see 
their future elsewhere.  
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Endnotes 
 
1
 Valery Perry‟s report gives fascinating insights into the international education 
reform process. 
2
 Selenic was also famous for challenging official censorship in his portrayal of 
Yugoslav labour camps in his novel Pismo Glava, like Aleksander Solzhenitsyn‟s 
One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitsch (1974). 
3
 Interview with Selenic, Belgrade, 21 October 1992; and Selenic‟s conversations 
with David Norris over a number of years. 
4
 Selenic has noted how while Timor Mortis was condemned as anti-Croatian, Ocevi i 
oci was attacked as anti-Serbian, and Prijatelji as insulting to Macedonians: the latter 
because a Serbian woman in the novel falls in love with an Albanian and leaves her 
Macedonian boyfriend. (See Jevtic, 1991, pp.30-31, p.43). 
 
